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Abstract 
This paper examines how family and non-family ownership affects the performance of Swiss 
listed firms from 2003 to 2010. We distinguish between these two types of controlling 
shareholders since they have different objectives. We hypothesise that only family 
shareholders have a real incentive to reduce agency costs whereas non-family blockholders 
are similar to widely held companies. Our results show that family firms are more profitable 
and sometimes display better market valuations as opposed to companies that are widely held 
or have a non-family blockholder. We investigate the impact of different features of family 
firms on performance, and document that the generation of the family, active involvement of 
the family and contestability of family control play an important role. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G3; G32 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines how founding family ownership affects the market and accounting 
performance of public companies as compared to companies with other types of ownership 
structures. It pays special attention to three features of family ownership: the generation of the 
family, the degree of involvement of family members and the contestability of control in the 
firm. The paper relates to the recent stream of empirical literature on the effects of 
concentrated ownership on firm performance.  
Until recently, the dominant paradigm in academic literature was that most public 
companies were widely held. The main challenge was to provide remedies to the classical 
agency problem present in such corporations. Berle and Means (1932) and later Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) are among the first to state that the separation between ownership and 
control can cause problems and incur important costs to shareholders. However, a series of 
recent studies on ownership structure reveals that in most markets a large number of listed 
companies do not have a widely dispersed ownership structure. In general, they have one or 
more large shareholders that can be categorised as families, states and other industrial or 
financial companies. Among these types of owners, family firms appear to be the most 
common form of ownership. In an international study, La Porta et al. (1999) find that 30% of 
firms are family controlled while 36% are widely held. Faccio and Lang (2002) show that 
family firms are the predominant ownership structure in continental Europe wherein 44% of 
the companies are family controlled. They also show that firms with non-family blockholders 
represent 20% of the sample. Claessens et al. (2000) observe that in Asian countries 
approximately two-thirds of firms are owned by families or individuals. Even in the US, a 
market considered to have a majority of companies with a dispersed ownership, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) establish that around 35% of companies in the S&P 500 are family 
controlled. This result has extensive repercussions on agency conflicts between owners and 
managers. This new view on ownership structure calls for a careful analysis of the 
consequences family ownership has on agency theory and company performance. Early 
literature on family firms finds that these firms seem to be more profitable and have a higher 
market valuation than non-family firms. It seems therefore that family ownership might be a 
way to reduce agency costs existing between managers and shareholders, and thus contribute 
to more value creation. The potential benefits associated with the presence of a majority 
shareholder are not new. Berle and Means (1932) already considered this possibility. Such a 
shareholder would have a far bigger incentive to control management since a large part of his 
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wealth is invested in the company. As a result, every shareholder would benefit from this 
situation1.  
The presence of a large shareholder can diminish or at least not aggravate the classical 
conflict between firm owners and managers, and thus reduces agency costs (agency costs I). 
However, the potential benefits of having a large shareholder in a company can be limited by 
the appearance of another type of agency problem. Large shareholders can use their power (in 
terms of votes and insider knowledge) to extract private benefits from the company. This will 
result in agency costs shifting from those between managers and owners to those between 
large shareholders and minority shareholders (agency costs II), which might be even more 
detrimental to minority shareholders. The extraction of private benefits is in the centre of this 
problem. Since the seminal paper of Grossman and Hart (1980), different authors have tried 
to quantify the magnitude of private benefits. Based on a sample of 39 markets worldwide, 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) observe that, on average, private benefits of control amount to 14% 
of equity value. These results indicate that agency problems between large and minority 
shareholders are a relevant issue. Problems are aggravated by the fact that many classic 
corporate governance mechanisms such as takeover threats or monitoring from institutional 
investors may become partly or completely ineffective especially if the controlling 
shareholder exercises a management position in the company or holds a majority stake. This 
position of knowledge and therefore power will also translate itself into the possibility to 
extract private benefits. From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear which of the two 
effects prevails in companies with a large shareholder. An increased monitoring of 
management that results in a better alignment of interests between owner and manager is 
positive, while the extraction of private benefits or entrenchment of a large shareholder is 
harmful to minority shareholders.  
We believe that it is essential to consider the identity of the controlling shareholder and 
especially the distinction between family and non-family blockholders to determine which of 
the two effects prevails. Different types of blockholders have different incentives and 
motivations that will affect their way of perceiving the company and minority shareholders. 
Considering family firms, Arregle et al. (2007) suggest that families do care about their 
companies as they constitute the majority of their wealth and are part of their identity and 
                                                 
1 An alternative view on the presence of a majority shareholder is proposed by Demsetz (1983). He argues that 
ownership concentration does not have an influence on firm value and that companies choose the form of 
ownership that minimises agency costs. This approach is further developed by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
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patrimony. This and the fact that the reputation, professionalism and perception of the family 
within its social environment are directly linked to the company works as a strong incentive 
to follow a long term strategy and behave in a way that is not purely self-centred (Ward 
(2004) and Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005)). Thus, family members may expropriate less 
as their main interest is not primarily pecuniary (Corbetta and Salvato (2004)) and may 
control outside managers more thoroughly. It is therefore likely that agency costs I and II are 
of less importance in these firms. For companies with other types of large shareholders, the 
above-mentioned incentives are less stringent. For example in a company in which the state is 
a large shareholder, the person representing the state does not have as high an incentive to 
monitor managers as a family member. He himself is only an employee of the state and as 
such his own wealth is not directly affected by suboptimal decisions of company 
management. Moreover, this person will probably have other mandates that will ask for his 
time, and he will not be able to fully concentrate on a specific company. Furthermore, 
negative news will not impact him as much as it would a family that is closely linked to the 
company and for whom company reputation equals family reputation. We consequently posit 
that family companies will behave very differently from companies with non-family 
blockholders which should have an impact on firm performance. Despite the considerable 
research conducted in the field of family business, the distinction between the family and 
non-family blockholder has not attracted much attention yet. 
In this paper, we try to fill this gap by using panel data over the period 2003–2010 for a 
comprehensive sample of companies listed on the Swiss exchange. The Swiss market present 
several important advantages for our empirical research in that its market capitalization is the 
12th largest in the world and the fourth largest in Europe. This market includes multinationals 
such as ABB, Nestlé, Novartis, Richemont, Roche or Swatch, and offers a rich diversity of 
listed companies with interesting features for studying how firm performance is altered by 
ownership structure. Sample firms cover multiple industries: they range from a rather small 
and local market focus to large and multinational activities, and from young and growing to 
old and mature which are representative of a typical economy. The Swiss market is known for 
its high ownership concentration, with owners ranging from founding families or private 
investors to the State as well as other financial or industrial corporations. This makes the 
Swiss market ideal to investigate the influence of ownership structures on performance. Our 
data indicates a quite balanced panel of companies comprising approximately 37% widely 
held companies, 36% founding family firms and the remainder having a different blockholder 
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type. Faccio and Lang (2002) show that in Western Europe there is no other country that has 
these balanced proportions; a majority are more heavily skewed towards family firms or 
widely held companies.  
In view of the above, we examine whether founding family owners have a different impact 
on accounting and market-based performance as compared to companies with a different 
blockholder type. In our research, we consider Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA) as 
performance measures. Employing a fixed effect model, we analyse the different 
characteristics of founding family firms to study the difference in performance. First, special 
emphasis is put on active management and generation of family members. The employment 
of family members as CEO or as Chairman should have an influence on performance, as a 
family member’s decisions can have a strong impact on the company. It equally helps the 
family to either better control outside managers and therefore mitigate agency costs I, or to 
extract even more private benefits which would increase agency costs II. Generational 
differences might equally impact performance as descendants might have different 
motivations and values than founders and be more prone to expropriation. We also examine 
the distinction between companies with a single individual or with multiple founders or 
family members having a key role in the firm. Furthermore, we take a closer look at different 
measures of contestability of the family blockholder. Families that have total control of their 
company might increase agency costs II as nobody can contest their decisions, and they are 
free to do what suits them best. 
Our main results show that founding family firms have a higher accounting-based 
performance but a similar valuation as compared to widely held companies and those with a 
non-family blockholder. However, firm characteristics have a significant impact on 
performance. A more detailed analysis reveals that it is especially firms at the founder stage 
that are more profitable and have significantly higher valuations. The benefits of family 
control are most pronounced for lone founders (feuds with other family members or founders 
are avoided) that are active in the firm. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that companies 
in which family control is not contestable show a better performance.   
This study contributes to existing literature in three important ways. First, it expands 
knowledge in the fast rising field of family firms. This field has gained impetus since 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) but has so far focused mainly on market and accounting 
performance as compared to either non-family firms or widely held companies. With the 
exception of Maury (2006) and Andres (2008), the impact of blockholder identity on 
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performance has not received much academic attention. Research on the link between identity 
and performance is important as it helps to draw inferences on how agency costs between 
controlling and minority shareholders can be reduced most effectively. Moreover, it sheds 
light onto family attributes that are associated with better firm performance.    
Second, the paper adds new evidence to the literature on control contestability. Literature 
in this field mostly finds a reduced performance for companies that use dual-class shares or 
other control-enhancing mechanisms. Our study goes further and investigates not only dual-
class structures but also family stakes and multiple blockholders to gauge whether 
contestability really is as positive as found or whether it also has a negative side. 
Third, the article provides the characteristics and scope of ownership structure and their 
relation to performance of firms in Switzerland. Evidence in this field and on this market is 
non-existent to the best of our knowledge. Even outside Switzerland, the relation between 
blockholder identity, familyness and performance is not widely researched; the focus is rather 
on family performance versus non-family firms. This approach may be inappropriate since in 
most countries there are not only widely held companies or family companies but also a 
fraction of firms having non-family blockholders that are likely to behave differently from 
families. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
evidence relating family ownership to firm performance. Section 3 describes the sample and 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces the methodology and presents results on 
the relationship between family ownership, other blockholders and firm performance. Section 
5 focuses on robustness tests and section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Family firms and performance 
In the last ten years, empirical studies on the performance of family firms have started to 
emerge for different countries. To gauge whether agency costs are reduced, these articles on 
family firms mainly study Tobin’s Q as a market-based indicator of performance and ROA or 
Return on Equity (ROE) as a profitability indicator.  
The first studies on the topic were published for the US and Canadian markets. Among 
these studies, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that family firms outperform their non-family 
counterparts in the S&P 500. For the US market especially, family firms with a founding 
family member CEO are more profitable. Descendants as CEOs, however, do not seem to 
affect performance positively or negatively. From those first studies, it seems that active 
 6 
 
management by the family, especially by the founder, appear to be important for the firm to 
create value and to be more profitable. Consequently, these initial results were extended to 
different markets and analysed in more refined ways. Villalonga and Amit (2006) in a study 
on Fortune 500 companies extend Anderson and Reeb’s analysis and find different results. 
They suggest focussing on the characteristics of family firms during the analysis of their 
performance. According to their results, firms in which the founder is active as CEO or 
chairman perform much better than those managed by descendants. A differentiation between 
ownership and control through control-enhancing mechanisms such as cross-holdings, 
pyramidal structures or dual-class shares also negatively affect firm performance in many 
cases. Miller et al. (2007) further distinguish family firms into those with lone founders and 
those considered true family firms with multiple family members involved. Controlling for 
different family definitions, they find evidence that family firm valuation is mainly driven by 
lone founder companies and that other family firms actually do not outperform. Fahlenbrach 
(2009) conducts an in-depth analysis on this founder phenomenon. . Examining companies in 
which founders still act as CEO, he observes a higher valuation for these companies and a 
10% abnormal return as compared to a benchmark 4 factor model. Pérez-González (2006) 
scrutinizes CEO succession in family firms. His findings show evidence that inherited control 
has a negative impact on both firm valuation and profitability, which can be interpreted as a 
sign of nepotism if founders put their heirs in charge of the firm instead of an outside CEO. 
This is especially the case for firms in which the descendant did not attend a selective college. 
Contrary to Anderson and Reeb, it shows that it is wrong to assume that family firms per se 
outperform non-family firms. Depending on the characteristics of the firm, the result may 
differ significantly. Companies at the founder stage are the main driver of such an 
outperformance in family firms. King and Santor (2008) study the Canadian market as it 
comprises similar regulatory structures as those of the US but has a more concentrated 
ownership, an attribute which makes it ideal for studies on family companies. They suggest 
that family firms are not bad as such in Canada. It is specifically the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms such as dual-class shares that destroy value, and not the presence of a family. 
Those with a single share class show a market performance similar to that of other 
companies, but with a higher ROA. Those with more than one share class have similar ROA 
but a worse market performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The advances made on this topic 
with regard to North American markets and the realisation that ownership concentration and 
 7 
 
family shareholder presence is even more pronounced in continental Europe has led to the 
investigation of this topic outside the US and Canada.   
As far as Western Europe is concerned, two cross-country studies by Barontini and Caprio 
(2006) and Maury (2006) using panel data observe that family firms may have a higher 
market valuation calculated as Tobin’s Q and a higher profitability under certain conditions. 
Barontini and Caprio find similarities to the study by Villalonga and Amit confirming that 
specifically, family firms with a founder CEO perform better than other firms. However, 
compared to the evidence obtained for the US, the performance of descendant-owned firms 
appears to be different. If the descendant family member only assumes a non-executive 
position, the firm still outperforms non-family firms; if he is CEO, it performs as well as non-
family firms; and only if the family takes up no active role at all, it performs worse. Maury, 
on the other side, indicates that active management only enhances profitability but does not 
have a real impact on firm valuation. He outlines that ownership and control level are drivers 
for market and accounting performance. Observing a nonlinear relation between control and 
performance, he suggests that benefits from family ownership fade with higher level of 
control. Market valuation expressed as Tobin’s Q is highest for firms with the family having a 
low control level. This may be interpreted as a sign of increased family opportunism and 
extraction of private benefits if the family gains too much power. On the contrary, 
profitability increases with family control level, which shows that family management 
improves company efficiency but minority shareholders cannot really profit from it.   
Evidence on single European countries presents similar findings. The first studies 
examined Scandinavian markets. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) observe that Swedish family 
firms frequently use dual-class shares and exercise their controlling position to pursue 
suboptimal investment decisions (thus having a low ROA) and entrench themselves. This 
produces a valuation discount and results in the lowest firm value on the market. Bennedsen 
et al. (2007) study the Danish market and look specifically at company valuations and CEO 
identity. Their evidence shows that family CEO have a negative impact on firm valuation 
while the appointment of professional outside CEO is beneficial. These initial negative 
findings on family firms were followed by studies on other countries that find a more positive 
link between family characteristics and firm value. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) research 
French-listed family firms and report that family firms outperform widely held companies, 
independent of a founder, descendant or outsider managing the firm. They additionally find 
that founders account for most of the outperformance, and propose different reasons linked to 
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labour force, wages and productivity to explain why the respective management type delivers 
superior performance. In a study on German listed firms, Andres (2008) finds that family 
firms are more profitable than both widely held companies and companies with other 
blockholder types. In line with evidence found in Sraer and Thesmar (2007), he finds that 
performance, in particular, increases with a founding family member actively managing the 
company and that founder-managed companies show the strongest effect on performance.   
On the whole, evidence suggests that family firms have an impact on firm performance for 
different reasons. The nature of the impact very much depends on the characteristics of the 
family and its ties to the company. The vast majority of these studies, with the notable 
exceptions of Andres (2008) and Maury (2006), analyse samples that compare family firms 
with non-family firms. Although this yields interesting insights, it does not provide the 
complete picture as non-family firms are not uniform. A widely held company will be 
governed differently from a company with a non-family blockholder. This distinction should 
be considered when examining the performance of family companies.   
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Sample 
The sample includes all companies listed on the Swiss Exchange between 2003 and 2010. 
First, we consider all companies that constitute the broadest stock index in Switzerland, the 
Swiss Performance Index. This restriction allows us to eliminate companies with a very low 
free float, open-end funds or companies that only have a secondary listing on the Swiss 
Exchange. The companies must have been part of this index for at least one year to be 
included in the study. Next, all financials (ICB 8000) are discarded; a stronger regulation of 
financial companies complicates the calculation of a comparable and correct Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. The sample period starts in 2003 because the publication of data on corporate 
governance for Swiss companies was not mandatory before this year. The period ends in 2010 
as it is the most recent fiscal year for which companies have reported their financial results. 
The final sample includes 185 companies (1193 firm-year observations).2  
As the research is focused on founding family firms, it is critical to have reliable 
information on the ownership structure of Swiss companies. This is mostly achieved through 
hand-collecting information from different sources. First, the data is collected from 
                                                 
2 In the regression, we can only use 1183 observations since we do not have complete information for 10 firm-
year observations.  
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companies’ annual reports and classified by shareholder type, such as widely held firms, 
companies with an individual shareholder, state-owned firms, companies with widely held 
industrial or financial corporations as an ultimate blockholder, and miscellaneous. Second, 
firms which report one or more individuals as blockholders are divided into founding family 
firms and firms with a private investor. If no clear evidence about the ultimate blockholder 
was obtained from annual reports, additional information was taken from Swiss stock guides, 
newspaper articles, corporate homepages or the commercial register. Data on managerial 
positions by family members and generational issues was retrieved by applying an equivalent 
procedure.  
In concluding the process, all data on corporate governance and ownership is finally 
merged with accounting and financial data from Thomson Reuters Worldscope and 
Datastream. This allows for reliable data and information on a vast array of companies from 
different industries, of different sizes and age and having different ownership structures.  
3.2. Ownership variables 
Following extant literature on family firms and blockholders, a company is defined as 
being widely held if no shareholder holds more than 20% of ultimate voting rights (see 
among others Villalonga and Amit (2006), Sraer and Thesmar (2007)). Although a threshold 
of 20% may seem low, there exists a widely accepted view that due to generally low annual 
meeting attendance and active representation of blockholders either as chairman of the board 
or CEO in many companies, it is sufficient for having an influence on company policies and 
management. 
 The term founding family is used for one or more individuals or families that founded a 
company or, when this is not the case, must have been an investor over a long period of time 
and have shaped the company in a substantial way. For example, the Hayek family controls 
the Swatch Group, a major watch manufacturer. It has held approximately 40% of the shares 
for most of the last 20 years. Both Mr Hayek senior (until his death in 2010) and junior as 
well as other family members are active in the firm and have shaped the company to make it 
what it is today. Although not controlled by the founding family, Swatch can be considered a 
family firm. This restriction ensures that firms with individuals who are pure financial 
investors are not mistaken for family firms. Founding family firms may also have been 
established by more than one individual or family (for example the Hoffmann and Oeri 
families for Roche or the Rihs brothers and Beda Diethelm for Sonova).  
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A non-founding family blockholder may have various identities. In the case of Swiss state 
ownership, it may not only refer to the Swiss Federal Government but also to regional 
(cantonal) and municipal government entities. For example, Zurich airport is owned by the 
region and city of Zurich. Widely held industrial and financial corporations in this context are 
companies that themselves do not have a dominant shareholder, for example, large stakes 
held by UBS or Credit Suisse. Miscellaneous includes blockholders that could not be 
classified into any other category. It is mostly composed of foundations, cooperatives or 
private pension funds. Contrary to these rather straightforward classifications, firms with 
private investors as large shareholders need more scrutiny. A private investor is defined as 
one or more individuals that have neither founded the company nor shaped it in a substantial 
way over the years. In case there is more than one private individual, it must clearly be stated 
that such investors have an agreement to vote together. For example, OC Oerlikon (formerly 
Unaxis) has seen changes to its shareholder structure all along the sample period. In 2005, 
two Austrian investors bought a major stake in the company, pushed the founding family 
completely out and planned to transform it into a European General Electric. After different 
feuds and economic and political problems, they gradually reduced their stakes by selling 
their holdings to a Russian billionaire. Neither of these investors founded the company and 
neither will stay in it for a considerable period of time, thereby making them private 
investors. This example shows that it is important to distinguish between the two ownership 
types, as motivations and values will strongly differ between a founding family and private 
investors who are only in the company to make a quick profit and then leave. Private 
investors will also differ from other non-family blockholders as they are more likely to reduce 
agency costs I (more incentives to control managers) but are more prone to agency costs II 
(more incentives to extract private benefits). Corresponding with these definitions and 
appearing in Tables 1 and 2, we have created different dummy variables that equal one if a 
company belongs to a specific category and zero otherwise. Overall, the sample consists of 
185 companies and 1193 firm-year observations that are composed of 431 founding family 
firm years, 323 firm years with a non-family blockholder and 439 widely held firm years.   
In addition, the dummy for founding family firms is divided into several sub-groups. First, 
a distinction is made between founding families owning the majority of voting rights (i.e. 
more than 50% of votes) or only a controlling stake between 20% and 50%. Several studies 
have shown that family firm characteristics, and here especially the active involvement of a 
family member, or generational issues may have an important impact on firm performance 
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and policy (e.g. Pérez-González (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006) or Bennedsen et al. 
(2007)). Considering these findings, founding family firms have further been categorised into 
groups depending on the active position and generation of a family member. We create 
dummies on the basis of the fact that the CEO or chairman of the board is a family member or 
an outsider. In case it is a family member, we further distinguish between founder and 
descendant. We also examine the impact of single or multiple founders or family members in 
a company. Consequently, we build dummies for family companies having a lone founder 
(i.e. a single person) or multiple individuals (i.e. multiple founders or family members 
involved). Finally, the founding family dummy is decomposed to test the contestability of the 
family stake. We first distinguish between family firms with and without dual-class shares 
and then on the contestability of family control. The control is assumed to be contestable and 
the dummy takes the value 1, if the family holds less than 50% of voting rights and a second 
blockholder exists to counterbalance its power.   
3.3. Performance and control variables 
Market and accounting performance is measured as Tobin’s Q and ROA, respectively. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as (market value of common equity + book value of total assets − book 
value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets. In case of companies with 
multiple listed share classes, the value of every single share class is added. Tobin’s Q is a 
forward-looking measure that reflects the market valuation of a firm’s assets (relative to book 
value). ROA is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. ROA is 
a backward-looking accounting measure that represents profitability or productivity.  
The following variables used to control for industry- and firm-specific characteristics, 
which are standard in the literature, are used for each year. Firm size is measured as the 
logarithm of total assets; age is defined as the logarithm of years since the foundation of the 
firm; leverage is measured as total book value of debt/common shareholder’s equity; 
investment intensity is capex/PPE; growth opportunities are represented by the increase in 
one-year sales; and risk by the beta of monthly returns of the preceding 60 months. Industry is 
defined according to the ICB classification.  
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Following the above-mentioned definitions, founding family firms represent on average 
36% of companies in the sample over the period 2003–2010; 37% are widely held companies 
while 27% are owned by non-family blockholders (corporations, government entities, 
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miscellaneous). These numbers remain very stable over the period examined with only very 
few companies changing categories. Our results are in line with Faccio and Lang (2002) who 
find that ownership is concentrated in Europe with only 37% of widely held companies and 
44% family companies. Their study also shows that in Switzerland ownership types, 
widespread ownership, family firms and non-family blockholders, are the most balanced in 
Western European countries with proportions of 28%, 48% and 24%, respectively.3 
Table 1 illustrates that family firms are included in 85% of all industries that make up the 
Swiss Performance Index. Family firms are the sole ownership type in three industries, 
namely, Leisure Goods, Beverages and Automobiles and Parts. There is no family firm in the 
underrepresented industries, Oil and Gas Producers, Food and Drug Retailers, Fixed Line 
Telecommunications and Electricity.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for different variables used in the following analysis. 
Average Tobin’s Q is 1.66 while average ROA is 6.58%. The firms in the sample have an 
average size and age of 3.60 billion Swiss francs and 70 years, respectively. Annual sales 
growth is 6.84% and leverage 54%. The difference between voting and ownership rights for 
controlling shareholders amounts to 5% on average. As expected, the average beta is very 
close to market beta with a value of 1.02. Investment intensity is at a level of 19%. Family 
firms represent 36% of the sample companies. About 36% (0.13/0.36) of founding family 
companies are at the founder stage and 61% (0.22/0.36) have a family holding a majority (i.e. 
at least 50% of voting rights) of shares. 37% of sample companies have a widespread 
ownership; 27% have a non-family blockholder that is either a private investor (41%), the 
state (20%), another company (27%) or miscellaneous (12%).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 shows results of the univariate analysis for different ownership types in the sample 
by testing difference of means and performing a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on medians 
between different ownership types. Tobin’s Q is not significantly different between widely 
                                                 
3 The difference in proportion for family firms is due to the distinction between founding families and private 
investors in this study.  
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held and founding family companies. It is however significantly lower in companies with a 
non-family blockholder than in the two aforementioned firm types. ROA is significantly 
higher in family firms than in companies with other ownership structures. These initial results 
seem to show that different blockholder types and ownership structures in general lead to 
divergent findings and deserve further investigation.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The difference (wedge) between cash flow and voting rights through multiple share classes 
is 11% for founding family firms but only 3% for non-family blockholder firms. This is a 
clear sign of family firms trying to preserve control in their companies4. Kunz (2002) states 
that the number of companies with dual-class shares has decreased over the last 20 years in 
Switzerland. This shows that families and companies are now more inclined to follow the 
one-share-one-vote principle. However, pressure from shareholders to change the voting 
structure has been less successful in companies in which a family is present. Leverage is 
significantly higher in companies with a non-family blockholder, while beta is significantly 
higher in widely held companies than the others.  
 
4. Empirical results  
We use a regression model with dummies for each year and industry under consideration 
to assess the relation between firm performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA) on the one side and 
founding family control on the other. The basic form of the regression model we estimate is  
 
i, j,t i i j,t i i i i, j,tPerformance familyfirm controlvar iables industries years             (1) 
 
where i equals the different performance measures for each company j at year t. Family 
firm is a dummy variable which takes account of the different founding family firm 
characteristics. Control variables include firm size, firm age, leverage, sales growth, 
investment intensity, beta and a dummy variable to identify widely held firms. Industries and 
                                                 
4 We find that Swiss firms essentially use dual-class shares as a control-enhancing mechanism. This is in line 
with results reported in Faccio and Lang (2002). 
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years are dummy variables equalling 1 for the respective industry and year observed, and zero 
otherwise. 
4.1. Family firm performance 
Table 4 examines market and accounting performance of founding family firms, widely 
held companies and firms with non-family blockholders. Column 1 and 3 take Tobin’s Q and 
ROA as a measure of market and accounting performance, respectively, with founding family 
being a dummy equalling 1 if the firm has a founding family as blockholder. The positive and 
significant coefficient for ROA suggests that family firms display a higher accounting 
performance than companies with non-family blockholders. However, this superior 
profitability is not reflected in valuation as Tobin’s Q does not significantly differ. Widely 
held companies neither display significant coefficients for Tobin’s Q nor for ROA, which 
signals that a non-family blockholder does not reduce agency costs I or that these costs are 
compensated by agency costs II.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Columns 2 and 4 complement the evidence on the performance of family firms for better 
understanding of the drivers of the positive relation between family firms and ROA and the 
insignificant Tobin’s Q coefficient. We study the possibility of a nonlinear relation between 
family control and firm performance. Previous studies (e.g. Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
Morck et al. (1988)) show that a nonlinear relation might exist if incentives of the shareholder 
change with an increased ownership stake. The founding family dummy is consequently 
changed into a continuous family ownership and squared family ownership variable (i.e. % of 
voting rights). Using both Tobin’s Q and ROA, we find a nonlinear relation. For Tobin’s Q, 
the highest value is reached at an inflection point of 39.5%, while the profitability tapers off 
at a level of 49.9% for ROA.  
Overall results suggest that profitability is higher for founding family firms. Valuation 
does not seem to be uniformly better across family companies. The market seems to 
appreciate the benefits of family shareholdings but only up to a level at which the family does 
not have total control of the company. Beyond this level, the family becomes too powerful, 
expropriation becomes more likely and investors get wary.   
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4.2. Active family involvement 
Earlier results on family firm performance show that it would be wrong to judge family 
firms as such without further differentiation. Evidence was found that performance might 
depend on a variety of other characteristics, and in our study, especially on the involvement 
of family members in the company. Studies on the generation and position a family member 
takes in the company have yielded different results. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that 
family firms with founder-CEO perform better whereas those with descendant-CEO 
underperform significantly compared to widely held companies. Barontini and Caprio (2006) 
show that descendant-stage firms only perform well if descendants do not take an active role 
in the company. On the other hand, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) suggest that a descendant-CEO 
does not perform worse than a founder-CEO.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows results for companies with active or passive family members. Columns 1 
and 4 show that both market and accounting performance are higher in companies in which a 
family member is active in management or on the board. This suggests that a family member 
possessing the ability to influence management and a direct way to influence company 
policies and strategies is essential. It equally shows that an active family member is able to 
generate a company dynamic that goes beyond what a non-family blockholder can achieve. 
Market valuation is especially driven by active founders. These are the only case for which a 
positive and significant relation exists between family ownership and Tobin’s Q, thereby 
suggesting that the market perceives a company founder as very positive and able to generate 
above-average results. This can be due to superior management skills, values or simply due to 
good ideas on policies or products. Companies in which no family member or descendants are 
active do not display a higher valuation than non-family blockholder firms. Although these 
firms are still more profitable than non-family firms, investors seem to mistrust these types of 
companies more than those with other blockholders.  
Profitability, on the other hand, is positive and significant across all types of family firms. 
Especially, companies in which family members have total control over management, the 
board outperforms strongly. This suggests that either agency costs I are non-existent as the 
owner is the manager or that superior profitability can only be achieved if the family has the 
power to push through its ideas and work practices without having to make concessions to 
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outside managers. Companies in which only the founder or the founder and a descendant are 
active have the highest profitability. Once again it seems that the founder has some superior 
knowledge or idea. Though descendants outperform, they do more so in combination with the 
founder, which again signals a strong founder effect.  
Overall it seems that family members, especially company founders, have superior skills 
and incentives that enhance a firm’s value above the gains that result from a reduction of 
agency costs from having a blockholder present. It gives a clear indication that it is not only 
important to have a blockholder to reduce agency costs I but also to have an individual who 
gives an additional edge to the company he manages. 
4.3. Founders, lone founders and descendants  
Family firm performance may be affected by many factors. One of them is linked to the 
power a founder has in his company. If he is alone, he might be able to manage the company 
in a way he believes is appropriate without the interference of other founders or family 
members. If the vision, knowledge or management style of the founder is what drives the 
company forward, then he, being a lone founder, might have a positive impact on 
performance. On the other hand, having multiple founders or family members involved in the 
company may lead to feuds or sub-optimal decision-making to satisfy family members rather 
than shareholders in general. A study of the Times Mirror Company by DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2000) clearly shows the negative effects such a situation can produce.    
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Results in Table 6 confirm that family companies have a higher accounting performance 
and sometimes a better market valuation than those firms with other types of ownership 
structures. It is, however, preferable to have a single person in a family firm. Both market and 
accounting performance are enhanced when there is only a lone founder or descendant (i.e. no 
multiple founders or family members hold stocks or are actively involved) in the company. It 
further seems that although firms at the descendant stage perform better than those with non-
family blockholders it is primarily those at the founder stage that clearly outperform and in 
which investors trust the most.  
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4.4. Family firm performance and contestability 
From the perspective of performance, especially valuation, contestability of the family 
might become important. Market participants might prefer to have the benefits of a family but 
not at any price. The presence of a family whose control is contestable in some way might 
help alleviate concerns. Table 7 therefore looks at several contestability measures. First it 
looks at the presence of dual-class shares. This control-enhancing mechanism can be used to 
lock in control of the company. Second it looks whether the family holds a majority of voting 
rights and therefore cannot be contested in any way. Third we construct a contestability 
dummy that equals 1 if a family holds between 20 and 50% of shares and the company has a 
second blockholder that might challenge family decisions.      
  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The use of multiple shares classes in family firms is perceived in a positive way by 
investors. Not only accounting but also market performance is higher for companies using 
dual-class shares. This implies that the use of multiple share classes is not negative as such. It 
seems that they are used only to lock in control and not to expropriate minority shareholders. 
All other measures of contestability do not yield significantly different results from a market 
perspective. From the viewpoint of profitability, results change significantly. Family firms 
whose control is not contestable display a higher ROA throughout all contestability measures. 
This indicates that a family is only able to generate a higher ROA if there is no outside 
pressure. 
 
5. Robustness tests   
A well-known potential problem when assessing the performance of family firms is 
endogeneity, or more specifically a reverse causality issue. It can be argued that it is not the 
ownership structure that yields a better performance of family firms but that, on the contrary, 
good performance influences the decision if a company is family controlled or not. The 
possibility exists that a family will only stay on as a shareholder or pass on the company if it 
performs well, but sell it if it underperforms. However, there are a number of observations 
that seem to indicate that this problem is not serious in our case. We observe that during the 
sample period, only nine companies changed their ownership structure from family firm to 
non-family firm. In four cases, the family owner lowered his stake under the 20% threshold to 
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about 15–19% and kept an active position as CEO, chairman or even both. In two other cases, 
the company was taken over by another a private person who plans to hold on to the shares 
for a longer period of time. In two cases, the company became a widely held company, and in 
another one, the family decided to give up its stake to avoid a control fight with another 
investor that was trying to take over the company. Thus, it cannot be argued that families 
departed due to poor performance of the company. It is also important to observe that family 
firms have an average age of 70 years. It is thus difficult to believe that families sell their 
shares in times of poor firm performance, or inversely are able to predict the future in a 
correct way over such a long period of time. It also seems implausible that a family can sell 
its stake in the company at a good price if it is really performing poorly. Finally, no other 
study on family firm performance has found that the presence of endogeneity alters the 
conclusions significantly.  
However to confirm these observations, we explicitly test for endogeneity by estimating 
treatment effect regressions using the two-step procedure developed by Heckman (1979). 
This procedure necessitates the use of at least one instrumental variable in the first-stage 
probit model. We use idiosyncratic risk as this variable has been used by several other authors 
in the literature (Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006),Miller et al. (2007)). 
This variable appears to have the requested qualities for a good instrument since it meets the 
exclusion restriction and is able to predict family firm status. The results of the treatment 
regressions are presented in Table 8. They are qualitatively similar to those obtained in Table 
4, since family firms still yield a higher profitability while the market value is not different 
from those of companies held by other blockholders. Heckman’s  is only significant for the 
ROA regressions while it is insignificant for the Tobin’s Q regressions5. The impact of 
endogeneity appears to be modest in our tests and confirms that the intuitive arguments given 
above are valid. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The analysis of family firm performance should effectively reflect the link between the 
specification and attributes. To verify the robustness of the results obtained in the previous 
sections, several tests are performed. We first analyse whether a bias can arise from 
                                                 
5 We also estimate the regression with an instrumental variables 2SLS procedure and find similar results to the 
treatment effect regression. The Heckman procedure is more appropriate since the potentially endogeneous 
regressor is a dummy variable. 
 19 
 
companies that drop out during the sample period. Therefore, we use a balanced sample that 
comprises 871 firm-year observations for 109 firms. In an unreported analysis, we find that 
the results are very similar to those obtained initially and that family firms outperform other 
firms in terms of profitability.6 We also run a year-by-year analysis and find that family firms 
are always more profitable, while not significantly, every year. Finally, we also test if our 
results are robust to the definition of accounting performance. We use the ROE instead of the 
ROA and find qualitatively similar results. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions  
Theory suggests that classical agency conflicts between managers and shareholders may be 
reduced for firms with a large shareholder because these have an incentive to control 
management. This reduction of agency problems should enable a company to create 
additional value for all shareholders. However, another type of agency problem between 
majority and minority shareholders may emerge. The extraction of private benefits by the 
majority shareholder can potentially have a value destroying effect on the firm. Several 
studies have shown that family firms create value and are more profitable than non-family 
firms. This evidence is in favour of the idea that agency costs can be reduced significantly by 
family shareholders. However, these findings do not make a clear distinction among non-
family firms. These range from firms with a widespread ownership base to companies having 
a large non-family blockholder.  
This paper provides new evidence on the performance of founding family firms. It focuses 
on the difference in market- and accounting based performance for companies with different 
ownership structures. It distinguishes founding family firms from companies that either have 
a non-family blockholder or are widely held. In particular, we want to find out if all 
companies with a blockholder can mitigate agency costs or if founding family firms have a 
special characteristic that allows them to outperform other company types beyond the 
reduction of agency costs. We investigate this issue on a sample of 185 Swiss firms over the 
period 2003–2010. This market is ideal to address this question as it has a balanced 
distribution of ownership structures with approximately one-third being family firms,  one-
third being widely held and the rest having a non-family blockholder.  
                                                 
6 All unreported results are available from the authors upon request. 
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In general, we find that founding family firms are more profitable than other companies 
but have similar valuations. This shows that families have the capacity to generate larger 
profits but that the market does not offer a value premium for these firms. A more detailed 
analysis reveals that firm characteristics have a significant impact on performance. We find 
that it is especially firms at the founder stage which are more profitable and have significantly 
higher valuations. The benefits of family control are most pronounced for firms with lone 
founders who are active in the firm. Furthermore, our results show that companies in which 
family control is not contestable show a better performance.  
Our results suggest that family control has a positive influence on performance, and that it 
helps to mitigate agency costs far better than other types of blockholders. These findings 
indicate that family firms must possess characteristics that allow them to create value for 
shareholders that other blockholders do not have. Possible explanations include that a 
founding family cannot afford to either lose out by not controlling management or to treat 
shareholders poorly by expropriating them. Only a family has a large part of its own wealth 
invested in the company, and therefore has an incentive to thoroughly control management. In 
case of other blockholders, its representative is himself only an agent (employee of the 
blockholder), and thus has much less of an incentive to control others as he does not directly 
bear the consequences of poor management or decision-making. On the other hand, a family 
will have difficulties in expropriating minority shareholders as it would put the company in a 
bad light and as an extension the family itself. Considering the tight-knit connections a family 
often has with its environment and stakeholders, it cannot and will not want to create a poor 
reputation. Furthermore, expropriating minority shareholders will complicate future equity 
issuance or will lead to an undervaluation of the company which will once again directly 
affect the wealth of family members. It appears that a founding family firm is the only 
company type in which the owner has an incentive both to mitigate agency costs I and not to 
expropriate stakeholders (minimisation of agency costs II).    
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Table 1 
Number and Percentage of Firm-years for each Industry and Ownership Type  
ICB
Code Industry Description All firms
Widely 
Held
Family 
Firm
Private  
Investor State
 WH 
Corporation 
 WH 
Financial Misc.
Family Firms 
in industry 
(%)
530 Oil & Gas Producers 5 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.00%
1350 Chemicals 65 43 22 0 0 0 0 0 33.84%
1730 Forestry & Paper 29 15 8 6 0 0 0 0 27.61%
1750 Industrial Metals & Mining 24 3 8 8 0 0 5 0 33.40%
2350 Construction & Materials 74 29 30 13 0 0 0 2 40.53%
2720 General Industrials 22 3 19 0 0 0 0 0 86.43%
2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 77 36 21 14 0 0 6 0 27.26%
2750 Industrial Engineering 207 78 85 32 0 3 8 1 41.06%
2770 Industrial T ransportation 32 0 8 10 8 0 0 6 25.04%
2790 Support Services 32 3 10 6 8 5 0 0 31.26%
3350 Automobiles & Parts 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 100.00%
3530 Beverages 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 100.00%
3570 Food Producers 63 19 16 0 0 5 0 23 25.38%
3720
Household Goods & Home 
Construction
36 10 10 15 0 0 1 0 27.77%
3740 Leisure Goods 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 100.00%
3760 Personal Goods 30 0 24 6 0 0 0 0 80.00%
4530 Health Care Equipment & Services 68 27 41 0 0 0 0 0 60.29%
4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 82 50 26 2 0 2 2 0 31.70%
5330 Food & Drug Retailers 17 8 0 0 0 9 0 0 0.00%
5370 General Retailers 44 12 10 14 0 1 7 0 22.73%
5550 Media 40 16 16 0 8 0 0 0 40.01%
5750 Travel & Leisure 63 18 14 7 8 5 5 6 22.23%
6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0.00%
7530 Electricity 40 3 0 0 21 16 0 0 0.00%
9530 Software & Computer Services 54 20 31 2 0 0 1 0 57.38%
9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 65 42 16 2 0 0 5 0 24.60%
Total 1193 439      431     137       61    46                 41            38    36.13%
Family firm is defined as founding families or individuals holding more than 20% of voting rights. A 20% ownership level is also 
used for the remaining ownership types (Private Investor, State, Widely held (WH) Corporation, WH Financial and Miscellaneous). 
A private investor is a private person that did not found the company. Widely held firms do not have any shareholder holding of 
20% or more voting rights. The sample contains 1193 firm-year observations taken from 185 firms included in the Swiss 
Performance Index for the period 2003–2010. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median
Standard 
deviation Maximum Minimum
Tobin's Q 1.66 1.33 1.02 9.09 0.30
ROA (in %) 6.58 7.32 10.64 35.11 -75.15
Return on Equity (in %) 9.42 10.69 22.38 235.99 -163.91
Wedge 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.66 -0.05
Firm size (total assets in CHF 000) 3'599'691     477'068      12'676'092     122'360'689      12'483        
Firm age (in years since inception) 69.92 55.00 61.09 492.00 1.00
Leverage (in %) 54.43 34.12 76.01 833.84 0.00
Sales growth (in %) 6.84 3.86 39.37 659.40 -99.75
Investment intensity (in %) 19.04 14.90 16.56 193.11 0.00
Beta 1.02 0.90 0.70 6.12 -1.72
Family firm 20-50% stake 0.14 0.00 0.35 1.00 0.00
Family Firm >50% stake 0.22 0.00 0.41 1.00 0.00
Widely Held 0.37 0.00 0.48 1.00 0.00
Founding family firm 0.36 0.00 0.48 1.00 0.00
Family firm (founder stage) 0.13 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.00
Family firm (descendant stage) 0.23 0.00 0.42 1.00 0.00
Private Investor 0.11 0.00 0.32 1.00 0.00
State 0.05 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.00
WH Corporation 0.04 0.00 0.19 1.00 0.00
WH Financial 0.03 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.00
Miscellaneous 0.03 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.00  
The variables for the analysed sample of 185 firms and 1193 firm-year observations include Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
ROE, the wedge (difference between voting and ownership rights), firm size, firm age, leverage (total 
debt/total equity), one-year sales growth, investment intensity (capex/PPE) and beta (calculated with returns 
over the previous 60 months). Variables related to the ownership structure (founding family firm, private 
investor, state, widely held (WH) corporation, WH financial and miscellaneous) denote a dummy taking the 
value 1, if the firm has this kind of blockholder with 20% or more voting rights. Family firm (20–50%; >50%) 
indicate a dummy equalling 1, if the founding family holds a stake of 20–50% or more than 50% in the family 
company, respectively. Family firm (founder and descendant stage) designate a dummy equalling 1, if the 
founding family is controlled by a founder or by descendants of the founder, respectively. Widely held denotes 
firms in which no shareholder has at least 20% of voting rights.    
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Table 3  
Univariate Tests 
Panel A: Test of means All firms Family firm Family firm
management
Other 
blockholder
Widely 
Held
Family vs. 
Family Mgmt
Family vs. 
Widely held
Family vs. 
Other blockholder
Other blockholder 
vs. Widely held
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean t-stat t-stat t-stat t-stat
Tobin's Q 1.66 1.70 1.76 1.45 1.78 -0.75 -1.02 3.87*** -4.91***
ROA (in % ) 6.58 7.92 7.88 5.70 5.92 0.07 2.63*** 3.71*** -0.27
Return on Equity (in % ) 9.42 12.20 12.08 8.15 7.62 0.07 2.95*** 2.61*** 0.33
Wedge 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.68 14.95*** 9.46*** 6.11***
Firm size (total assets in CHF 000) 3'599'691      3'235'442      1'640'451        1'558'027      5'459'482       3.09*** -2.25** 3.22*** -4.47***
Firm age (in years since inception) 69.92 68.47 62.51 88.97 57.32 1.72* 3.31*** -4.10*** 6.09***
Leverage (in % ) 54.43 53.55 54.57 66.90 46.11 -0.15 1.44 -2.22** 4.11***
Sales growth (in % ) 6.84 6.07 6.96 6.61 7.76 -0.30 -0.59 -0.23 -0.40
Investment intensity (in % ) 19.04 18.77 19.62 16.44 21.23 -0.75 -2.20** 2.05** -3.78***
Beta 1.02 0.98 1.00 0.82 1.20 -0.45 -4.79*** 3.26*** -6.99***
Observations 1193 431 294 323 439
 
Panel B: Test of medians All firms Family firm Family firm
management
Other 
blockholder
Widely 
Held
Family vs. 
Family Mgmt
Family vs. 
Widely held
Family vs. 
Other blockholder
Other blockholder 
vs. Widely held
Median Median Median Median Median
Tobin's Q 1.33 1.38 1.50 1.21 1.40 -3.30*** -1.11 4.25*** -5.26***
ROA (in % ) 7.32 8.37 8.64 6.26 7.82 -0.62 1.16 5.01*** -3.15***
Return on Equity (in % ) 10.69 11.87 12.64 8.80 10.81 -1.19 1.72* 3.54*** -1.53
Wedge 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.32 14.44*** 8.02*** 7.64***
Firm size (total assets in CHF 000) 477'068   556'223        475'532          468'434        437'900      1.97** 0.98 1.11 0.29
Firm age (in years since inception) 55.00 68.00 48.00 95.00 32.00 4.50*** 4.54*** -3.40*** 6.05***
Leverage (in % ) 34.12 26.89 25.72 46.39 32.40 1.40 -0.72 -4.43*** 4.12***
Sales growth (in % ) 3.86 4.73 4.85 4.71 2.35 -0.55 1.52 -0.39 1.65*
Investment intensity (in % ) 14.90 16.42 17.11 12.21 15.87 -1.82* -0.98 3.98*** -5.01***
Beta 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.66 1.15 -0.17 -4.36*** 4.79*** -7.52***
Observations 1193 431 294 323 439
The variables for the analysed sample of 185 firms and 1193 firm-year observations include Tobin’s Q, ROA, the wedge, firm size, firm age, leverage, one-year sales growth, 
investment intensity and beta. Tests are performed on the difference of means (Panel A) and medians (Panel B:Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test) between family vs. family 
managed firms, family companies vs. widely held firms, family companies vs. firms with other blockholder types and widely held vs. companies with non-family 
blockholders. 
***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Performance and Family Ownership 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Founding family 0.079 2.825***
(1.26) (2.66)
Family stake 0.770** 14.641***
(2.46) (2.80)
(Family stake)2 -1.026** -14.679**
(-2.57) (-2.32)
Wedge -0.431* -0.268 -3.415 -2.806
(-1.84) (-1.37) (-1.03) (-0.93)
Ln (firm size) 0.065*** 0.062*** 1.681*** 1.658***
(4.23) (4.04) (5.18) (5.15)
Ln (firm age) -0.000 -0.002 0.879 0.885
(-0.00) (-0.06) (1.47) (1.48)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.013*** -0.013***
(-1.42) (-1.28) (-2.61) (-2.63)
1-year sales growth 0.001* 0.001 0.022 0.022
(1.66) (1.60) (1.09) (1.09)
Investment intensity 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.112** 0.112**
(3.88) (3.84) (2.47) (2.47)
Beta 0.006 0.001 -1.490* -1.470*
(0.18) (0.02) (-1.83) (-1.79)
Widely held 0.055 0.071 1.063 1.294
(0.97) (1.26) (0.97) (1.19)
Constant -1.157*** -1.108*** -27.676*** -27.615***
(-4.63) (-4.53) (-4.56) (-4.56)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1183 1183 1183 1183
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.14
Inflection point (% ) 39.50% 49.90%
ln (Tobin's Q) ROA
 
The variables for the analysed sample of 185 firms and 1193 firm-year observations 
include Tobin’s Q, ROA, the wedge (difference between voting and ownership 
rights), firm size, firm age, leverage (total debt/total equity), one-year sales growth, 
investment intensity (capex/PPE) and beta. Founding family denotes a dummy 
taking the value 1 if the founding family holds at least 20% of voting rights in the 
firm. Family stake and (Family stake)2 indicate the stake and the stake squared that 
the founding family, respectively, holds in the company. The t-stats are in 
parentheses and are calculated with clustered robust standard errors. 
 ***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Family Ownership and Active Involvement 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family - active 0.117* 3.017***
(1.80) (2.66)
Family CEO & CoB 0.122 3.802**
(1.36) (2.45)
Family CEO 0.066 3.155**
(0.76) (2.01)
Family CoB 0.132 2.650**
(1.62) (2.02)
Founder active alone 0.183* 4.504**
(1.91) (2.26)
Descendant active alone 0.072 1.989*
(0.98) (1.84)
Founder and Descendant
active
0.184 4.651***
(1.16) (3.95)
No family active -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 2.372* 2.403* 2.268*
(-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.18) (1.75) (1.76) (1.67)
Wedge -0.413* -0.391* -0.374 -3.326 -3.767 -2.437
(-1.76) (-1.69) (-1.60) (-0.99) (-1.11) (-0.76)
Ln(firm size) 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 1.689*** 1.701*** 1.686***
(4.42) (4.38) (4.39) (5.18) (5.16) (5.12)
Ln(firm age) 0.004 0.003 0.012 0.901 0.923 1.074
(0.16) (0.12) (0.42) (1.49) (1.51) (1.60)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.013*** -0.013** -0.013**
(-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.34) (-2.60) (-2.60) (-2.48)
1-year sales growth 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.022 0.022 0.022
(1.64) (1.62) (1.70) (1.09) (1.09) (1.11)
Investment intensity 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.112** 0.112** 0.110**
(3.86) (3.85) (3.83) (2.46) (2.46) (2.43)
Beta 0.004 0.003 0.002 -1.496* -1.505* -1.558*
(0.14) (0.12) (0.05) (-1.83) (-1.84) (-1.90)
Widely held 0.055 0.056 0.061 1.064 1.069 1.201
(0.97) (0.99) (1.09) (0.98) (0.98) (1.10)
Constant -1.191*** -1.177*** -1.215*** -27.844*** -28.116*** -28.382***
(-4.81) (-4.74) (-4.75) (-4.56) (-4.54) (-4.46)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183
Adj. R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.14
ROAln(Tobin's Q)
 
The variables for the analysed sample of 185 firms and 1193 firm-year observations include Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
the wedge (difference between voting and ownership rights), firm size and age, leverage (total debt/total equity), 
one-year sales growth, investment intensity (capex/PPE) and beta. Family active denotes a dummy taking the 
value 1 if a member of the founding family is active in the company. Family CEO & chairman (CoB), CEO, 
CoB and no family active indicate a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a family member is either CEO & 
CoB, CEO only, CoB only or if there is no active family member. Founder or descendant active alone and 
founder and descendant active denote a dummy equalling 1 if the founder or the descendant or both are active in 
the company. The t-stats are in parentheses and are calculated with clustered robust standard errors. 
***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively  
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 Table 6  
Family Ownership and Generations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Founder-stage family firm 0.140* 4.043**
(1.70) (2.46)
Descendant-stage family firm 0.038 1.997*
(0.50) (1.83)
Lone founder firm 0.190* 5.328**
(1.76) (2.34)
Family firm with multiple founders 0.060 2.395**
(0.91) (2.33)
Lone founder or descendant firm 0.183* 4.298***
(1.91) (2.65)
Family firms with 
multiple family members 0.037 2.229**
(0.57) (2.06)
Wedge -0.365 -0.410* -0.365 -2.100 -2.944 -2.481
(-1.50) (-1.77) (-1.58) (-0.65) (-0.87) (-0.73)
Ln (firm size) 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 1.675*** 1.674*** 1.676***
(4.25) (4.27) (4.21) (5.19) (5.21) (5.16)
Ln (firm age) 0.011 0.005 0.002 1.107 0.993 0.915
(0.39) (0.19) (0.09) (1.63) (1.64) (1.54)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.013** -0.013** -0.014***
(-1.31) (-1.35) (-1.75) (-2.52) (-2.55) (-2.69)
1-year sales growth 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.022 0.022 0.021
(1.72) (1.72) (1.57) (1.11) (1.11) (1.07)
Investment intensity 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.110** 0.111** 0.111**
(3.83) (3.87) (3.87) (2.44) (2.47) (2.46)
Beta 0.005 0.006 0.005 -1.506* -1.483* -1.498*
(0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (-1.85) (-1.82) (-1.84)
Widely held 0.061 0.058 0.056 1.189 1.132 1.069
(1.08) (1.02) (0.98) (1.08) (1.03) (0.98)
Constant -1.192*** -1.173*** -1.154*** -28.378*** -28.029*** -27.623***
(-4.69) (-4.71) (-4.54) (-4.52) (-4.61) (-4.53)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.14
ln (Tobin's Q) ROA
The variables for the analysed sample of 185 firms and 1193 firm-year observations include Tobin’s Q, ROA, the wedge 
(difference between voting and ownership rights), firm size, firm age, leverage (total debt/total equity), one-year sales 
growth, investment intensity (capex/PPE) and beta. Founder- and descendant-stage family firms indicate a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the company is held by the founder or by the descendants, respectively. Lone founder denotes a dummy 
equalling 1 if there is only one founder involved. A company with multiple founders indicates a dummy equalling 1 for 
companies with multiple founders or family members involved. Lone founder and descendant as well as family firm with 
several members designates a dummy taking the value 1 if a founder or a descendant is alone in the firm and if there are 
multiple family members or individuals controlling the company, respectively. The t-stats are in parentheses and are 
calculated with clustered robust standard errors. 
***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7  
Family Ownership and Contestability 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family owning 20-50% 0.083 2.043
(1.00) (1.49)
Family owning more than 50% 0.075 3.551***
(1.06) (3.13)
Family firm w/out DCS 0.056 2.564**
(0.77) (2.14)
Family firm with DCS 0.149* 3.627**
(1.68) (2.25)
Family is contestable 0.059 2.409*
(0.69) (1.72)
Family is not contestable 0.091 3.082***
(1.35) (2.78)
Wedge -0.421* -0.634** -0.460* -5.219 -5.750 -4.019
(-1.74) (-2.05) (-1.96) (-1.55) (-1.20) (-1.19)
Ln (firm size) 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 1.700*** 1.682*** 1.689***
(4.21) (4.26) (4.27) (5.26) (5.18) (5.20)
Ln (firm age) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.899 0.880 0.888
(-0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (1.50) (1.47) (1.48)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.014*** -0.013** -0.013***
(-1.41) (-1.34) (-1.45) (-2.66) (-2.56) (-2.63)
1-year sales growth 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.022 0.022 0.022
(1.65) (1.67) (1.67) (1.10) (1.09) (1.09)
Investment intensity 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.114** 0.112** 0.113**
(3.82) (3.87) (3.85) (2.49) (2.47) (2.47)
Beta 0.005 0.006 0.007 -1.391* -1.482* -1.467*
(0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (-1.66) (-1.81) (-1.78)
Widely held 0.056 0.049 0.054 0.980 0.992 1.041
(0.97) (0.85) (0.95) (0.90) (0.90) (0.95)
Constant -1.155*** -1.155*** -1.165*** -28.070*** -27.644*** -27.840***
(-4.63) (-4.64) (-4.69) (-4.63) (-4.56) (-4.57)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.14
ln (Tobin's Q) ROA
 
The variables for the analysed sample of 185 firms and 1193 firm-year observations include Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
the wedge (difference between voting and ownership rights), firm size, firm age, leverage (total debt/total 
equity), one-year sales growth, investment intensity (capex/PPE) and beta. A family owning 20–50%, family 
owning more than 50% indicate a dummy equalling 1 if the company has a family owning 20–50% or more than 
50% of the stocks, respectively. Family firm with or w/out DCS (dual-class shares) designates a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the company is using dual-class shares or not. A family is contestable or not contestable 
represents a dummy taking the value 1 if a founding family controls between 20–50% of voting rights in the 
presence of a second blockholder or if it does not. The t-stats are in parentheses and are calculated with clustered 
robust standard errors. 
***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 8  
Endogeneity and the Heckman Procedure 
ln (Tobin's Q) ROA
Founding family 0.287 30.388**
(instrumented) (-1.02) (-2.21)
Wedge -0.806 -53.219*
(-1.56) (-1.95)
Ln (firm size) 0.068*** 1.987***
(-8.42) (-5.04)
Ln(firm age) -0.000** -0.010
(-2.22) (-1.33)
Leverage 0.001** 0.020
(-2.12) (-0.68)
1-year sales growth 0.007*** 0.106**
(-9.32) (-2.42)
Investment intensity 0.010 -0.946
(-0.49) (-0.96)
Beta 0.056* 1.199
(-1.76) (-1.25)
Widely held 0.004 1.403**
(-0.29) (-2.01)
Constant -1.265*** -41.969***
(-4.60) (-4.02)
Heckman's λ -0.124 -16.435**
(-0.34) (-2.02)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1183 1183  
This table presents the results of the treatment regressions of the Heckman (1979) 
procedure and the selection () parameter. The variables for the analysed sample of 185 
firms and 1193 firm-year observations include Tobin’s Q, ROA, the wedge (difference 
between voting and ownership rights), firm size, firm age, leverage (total debt/total 
equity), one-year sales growth, investment intensity (capex/PPE) and beta. Founding 
family denotes a dummy taking the value 1 if the founding family holds at least 20% of 
voting rights in the firm. The t-stats are in parentheses and are calculated with clustered 
robust standard errors. 
***, **, * show significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.  
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